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Abstract
This paper considers the policy evaluation problem in a multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL)
environment over decentralized and directed networks. The focus is on decentralized temporal
difference (TD) learning with linear function approximation in the presence of unreliable or even
malicious agents, termed as Byzantine agents. In order to evaluate the quality of a fixed policy in a
common environment, agents usually run decentralized TD(λ) collaboratively. However, when some
Byzantine agents behave adversarially, decentralized TD(λ) is unable to learn an accurate linear
approximation for the true value function. We propose a trimmed-mean based Byzantine-resilient
decentralized TD(λ) algorithm to perform policy evaluation in this setting. We establish the finite-
time convergence rate, as well as the asymptotic learning error in the presence of Byzantine agents.
Numerical experiments corroborate the robustness of the proposed algorithm.
1. Introduction
Reinforcement learning (RL) is a promising paradigm of modern artificial intelligence. An agent in
RL acts under a specific policy, interacts with an unknown environment, observes environment state
changes, receives rewards, and improves the policy. RL has demonstrated great potential in various
applications, including autonomous driving (Chen et al., 2015), robotics (Gu et al., 2017), power
network (Kar et al., 2013), to name a few.
Among many algorithms that are central to RL is the temporal-difference (TD) learning approach.
TD learning provides a unified framework to evaluate a policy in terms of the long-term discounted
accumulative reward. Within the family of TD algorithms, TD(λ) is a popular one (Sutton, 1988).
However, the classical TD(λ) is a tabular-based approach, which stores the entry-wise value function
state-by-state. In many RL applications, however, the number of elements in the state space is large.
Thus, it is impractical or even impossible to evaluate the value function on a per state basis. This is
also referred to as the curse of dimensionality. Therefore, TD with function approximation is usually
preferable, which includes linear or non-linear approximators (Mnih et al., 2015; Silver et al., 2016).
Going beyond the single-agent RL setting, many practical scenarios contain rewards distributed
over multiple agents without a central coordinator. In this multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL)
scenario, agents cooperate with each other to explore an unknown environment and accomplish a
specific task (Zhang et al., 2018; Wai et al., 2018; Chen et al., 2018; Lee et al., 2019; Zhang et al.,
2019). A broad range of applications over mobile sensor networks (Cortes et al., 2004) and power
networks (Kar et al., 2013) can be modeled as MARL problems. Typically, agents in MARL are
assumed to be reliable; that is, they share accurate information with others. In this circumstance,
TD(λ) can be implemented over a MARL environment in a decentralized manner (Doan et al., 2019).
However, the agents in MARL are not always reliable. Communication errors, data corruptions
or even malicious attacks may happen during the training process. We model all these unreliable
behaviors as Byzantine attacks (Lamport et al., 1982; Yang et al., 2019). In this Byzantine attack
model, adversarial agents are able to arbitrarily manipulate their outputs, collude with each other
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and inject false information into the MARL environment. Decentralized TD, and policy evaluation in
general, in the presence of Byzantine agents are yet less understood areas.
To perform decentralized policy evaluation under Byzantine attacks, we propose a novel Byzantine-
resilient decentralized TD(λ) with linear function approximation that we term Byrd-TD(λ). Different
from existing decentralized TD(λ) such as that in (Doan et al., 2019), Byrd-TD(λ) is a robust version
of TD(λ), uses a robust aggregation technique to alleviate the negative effect of Byzantine agents,
and guarantees global convergence even under Byzantine attacks. However, the theoretical analysis,
especially the non-asymptotic analysis of Byrd-TD(λ), is nontrivial. First, the existence of Byzantine
agents prevents the honest agents from obtaining accurate information from their neighbors, and the
induced error propagates through the TD(λ) dynamics. Second, the fact that the TD(λ) update
does not follow stochastic gradient of any objective function brings a series of difficulties to the non-
asymptotic analysis of Byrd-TD(λ) by leveraging the first-order optimization toolbox.
Related works. TD learning plays an important role in policy evaluation for RL. The family
of TD methods include gradient TD (Sutton et al., 2008, 2009), least-squares TD (Lazaric et al.,
2012; Bradtke and Barto, 1996), least-squares policy evaluation (Nedic´ and Bertsekas, 2003), etc.
As a representative algorithm, TD(λ) provides a unified framework for policy evaluation (Sutton,
1988), with the parameter λ ∈ [0, 1] controlling the trade-off between approximation accuracy and
convergence rate. Several existing works have shown the convergence of TD(λ) with linear function
approximation. The works of (Tsitsiklis and Van Roy, 1997; Dayan, 1992) focus on the asymptotic
convergence and other steady-state properties of TD(λ). Several works provide finite-time analysis
(Bhandari et al., 2018; Lakshminarayanan and Szepesvari, 2018; Dalal et al., 2018; Sun et al., 2020),
but their results hold only when using projection operation or assuming independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) noise. Some of these assumptions have been relaxed in the recent works of (Srikant
and Ying, 2019). Building upon these work, convergence analysis of decentralized TD has been studied
recently in (Doan et al., 2019; Sun et al., 2019).
Some exploratory efforts have been made to robustify RL approaches. In the single-agent setting,
algorithms have been developed to alleviate the negative effect from approximation error in (Lu et al.,
2019), or to robustify the learned policy in making decisions, e.g., (Tirinzoni et al., 2018; Petrik and
Russel, 2019). However, little is known on how to robustify RL methods during the training stage in
the single-agent RL setting, and in the MARL setting – an even less explored area.
On the other spectrum, designing Byzantine-resilient algorithms has become a popular topic in
distributed and decentralized machine learning, with applications mainly in supervised learning. Most
algorithms in this regime replace the mean or weighted mean aggregation rules in Byzantine-free
stochastic gradient methods with robust aggregation rules, such as geometric median (Chen et al.,
2017; Xie et al., 2018a), coordinate-wise median (Yin et al., 2018), trimmed mean (Xie et al., 2018b),
Krum (Blanchard et al., 2017), Bulyan (El Mhamdi et al., 2018), and RSA (Li et al., 2019), or
robustify the updates with malicious agent identification (Alistarh et al., 2018). These aforementioned
methods require a central node to coordinate the agents, which is different to our decentralized MARL
setting. Existing decentralized Byzantine-resilient algorithms include the subgradient method with
total variation-norm penalization (Peng and Ling, 2020), BRIDGE (Yang and Bajwa, 2019), and
MOZI (Guo et al., 2020). However, these algorithms are all targeted to supervised learning either in
i.i.d. or deterministic settings. Policy evaluation in MARL with adversarial agents is, by its nature, a
stochastic optimization problem with non-i.i.d. and decentralized data. To the best of our knowledge,
no Byzantine-resilient SGD-based algorithm has been developed in this regime. Therefore, existing
Byzantine-resilient algorithms can not be applicable to policy evaluation, especially in MARL.
Our contributions. The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
1. Targeting policy evaluation in MARL, we propose a Byzantine-resilient decentralized TD(λ)
with linear function approximation, abbreviated as Byrd-TD(λ), in decentralized and directed net-
works. Byrd-TD(λ) generalizes the robust aggregation rule (Yang and Bajwa, 2019; Vaidya, 2012) to
the regime of stochastic optimization, which is of independent interest.
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Agent 𝑛
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Figure 1: MARL with Byzantine agents.
2. To analyze our algorithm, we generalize the existing trimmed mean analysis to the stochastic
setting with time-varying graphs. We establish the non-asymptotic analysis for Byrd-TD(λ) under
Markovian observations. Our analysis implies that the network topology influences the convergence
rate, and the asymptotic learning error is determined by the variation of local rewards and the degree
of network unsaturation.
3. We conduct experiments using a standard MARL benchmark, the cooperative navigation task,
over various networks. It is confirmed that Byrd-TD(λ) can successfully learn the linear value function
estimate under Byzantine attacks.
2. Byzantine-resilient Decentralized TD
Markov reward process (MRP) in MARL. Consider a MARL environment consisting of N = |N |
honest agents and B = |B| Byzantine agents, where N and B denote the sets of honest agents and
Byzantine agents, respectively. Suppose agents can only communicate with each other through a
given directed graph G := (N ∪ B, E), where E ⊆ (N ∪ B) × (N ∪ B) is the edge set without self-
link. An honest agent n can only send information to its out-neighbors in On = {m|(n,m) ∈ E}
and receive information from its in-neighbors in Nn ∪ Bn, where Nn = {m|(m,n) ∈ E ,m ∈ N} and
Bn = {m|(m,n) ∈ E ,m ∈ B} are the honest (excluding n itself) and Byzantine in-neighbor sets of
honest agent n, respectively. We define the numbers of its honest and Byzantine in-neighbors by
Nn = |Nn| and Bn = |Bn|, respectively. The goal is to evaluate a fixed policy in a MRP.
A typical MRP1 can be described by a 5-tuple (S,P, γ, ρ0, {Rn}n∈N ), where S is a set of states
shared by all agents, P is the space of the state transition kernels with the probability of transiting
from state s to s′ being defined as P(s, s′), γ ∈ (0, 1) is the discounting factor, ρ0 is the initial state
distribution, and Rn(s, s′) is the finite local reward of agent n from state s to s′. At each state
transition s → s′, every honest agent n in MARL only observes its local reward Rn(s, s′) from the
environment and has access to its local reward function Rn(s, s′). The global reward function of MRP
is defined as the average of the local rewards 1N
∑
n∈N Rn(s, s′). The goal of policy evaluation is to
find the long-term discounted accumulative reward starting from the initial state s, which is referred
to as the value function of state s, given by
V(s) := E
[
1
N
∞∑
k=0
γk
∑
n∈N
Rn(sk, sk+1)
∣∣∣∣∣ s0 = s
]
, (1)
where the expectation is taken over all possible state trajectories {s0, s1, . . . , sk, . . . }.
1. To simplify the notation, we will drop the dependence on the policy and thus the action as those considered in the
Markov decision process, since the policy to be evaluated is fixed.
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TD(λ) with function approximation. One way to find the value function is to solve the
so-termed Bellman equation, which is a system of linear equations of V(s), given by
V(s) = 1
N
∑
s′∈S
P(s, s′)
(∑
n∈N
Rn(s, s′) + γV(s′)
)
, ∀s ∈ S. (2)
If P(s, s′) is known and the number of elements in the state space |S| is small, one can find V(s) by
solving this system of linear equations. On the other hand, if P(s, s′) is unknown yet |S| is manageable,
tabular-based TD methods have impressive performance. Unfortunately, when the number of elements
in S is large or even infinite, it is impractical to find an exact solution or even evaluate a solution to
(2). Instead, one has to resort to function approximation of V(s).
Consider an approximation function Vθ(s) parameterized by a vector θ ∈ RD. In this paper, we
consider linear approximation, such that Vθ(s) := φ(s)
>θ, where φ(s) ∈ RD is the pre-defined feature
vector of state s. For the sake of computational tractability, we often have the number of unknown
parameters D  |S|. With the above linear approximation, the task is to search for an appropriate
parameter θ that solves the following optimization problem
min
θ
F (θ) :=
1
2
∑
s∈S
ρ(s)(Vθ(s)− V(s))2, (3)
where ρ(s) is the stationary distribution of state s associated with the MRP. Observe that F (θ)
represents the weighted least-squares approximation error with the linear model parameter θ.
When there is a central node to coordinate the learning process, one can solve (3) using the iterative
gradient descent method θk+1 = θk − ηk∇F (θk), where ηk > 0 is the step size at step k. However,
the exact gradient ∇F (θk) or even its unbiased stochastic estimate is unavailable in practice. This
motivates the use of TD (λ) with linear function approximation. Let us define the eligibility trace as
zk :=
k∑
κ=0
(γλ)k−κ∇θκVθκ(s) =
k∑
κ=0
(γλ)k−κφ(sκ), (4)
where λ ∈ [0, 1] is a predefined parameter. Then, the update of TD(λ) can be written as
θk+1 = θk +
ηk
N
∑
n∈N
(
rkn +
(
γφ(sk+1)− φ(sk)
)>
θk
)
zk (5)
where rkn := Rn(sk, sk+1). It is known that TD(λ) reduces to TD(0) when λ = 0, and to the Monte
Carlo sampling method when λ = 1 (Sutton and Barto, 2018, Chap. 7).
Decentralized TD(λ) under Byzantine attacks. To implement TD(λ) in the MARL environ-
ment, every honest agent n maintains its own model θkn ∈ RD. At step k, the honest agent n observes
the system transition from state sk to sk+1, calculates the local reward rkn, updates the eligibility
trace by
zk = γλzk−1 + φ(sk), (6)
and computes the local TD(λ) increment at agent n by
gkn(θ
k
n) :=
(
rkn + (γφ(s
k+1)− φ(sk))>θkn
)
zk. (7)
After computing their local increments, the agents communicate with each other to exchange the
latest local models. The honest agent n collects θkm from all in-neighbors m in Nn ∪ Bn, averages
them, and uses the local increment ηkgkn(θ
k
n) to update the local model as
θk+1n =
1
Nn +Bn + 1
∑
m∈Nn∪Bn∪{n}
θkm + η
kgkn(θ
k
n). (8)
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Algorithm 1 Byrd-TD(λ)
Require: fixed policy; step size ηk; initial model θ0n = θ
0
and z−1 = 0; qn for all honest agents n
for all k = 0, 1, 2, · · · do
for all honest agents n do
Send θkn to all out-neighbors m ∈ On
Receive θkm from all in-neighbors m ∈ Nn ∪ Bn
end for
Transition from state sk to sk+1
for all honest agents n do
Observe the local reward rkn
Compute zk following (6)
Compute gkn(θ
k
n) following (7)
for d = 1, . . . , D do
Update [θk+1n ]d following (11)
end for
end for
end for
The update rule (8) seems plausible.
However, the main challenge of implement-
ing (8) is that while θkm are true models
for m ∈ Nn, they can be arbitrary vec-
tors for m ∈ Bn. But the honest agent n
cannot distinguish Byzantine agents from
all the in-neighbors. Motivated by the
Byzantine-resilient supervised learning al-
gorithms (Blanchard et al., 2017; Yang and
Bajwa, 2019; Guo et al., 2020), in this paper
we propose to robustify (8) by incorporat-
ing coordinate-wise trimmed mean to resist
Byzantine attacks. Before taking averages
over the messages received from their in-
neighbors, the agents first discard the out-
liers on a per coordinate basis. To be spe-
cific, the honest agent n estimates the num-
ber of Byzantine neighbors Bn and chooses
a trimming number qn ≥ Bn. At every dimension d, the honest agent n discards the largest qn and
smallest qn elements of the received messages before taking average. We use N k+n (d) and N k−n (d) to
denote the index sets of discarded elements
N k−n (d) := arg min
M:{M⊂Nn∪Bn,|M|=qn}
∑
m∈M
[θkm]d, (9)
N k+n (d) := arg max
M:{M⊂Nn∪Bn,|M|=qn}
∑
m∈M
[θkm]d, (10)
where [θkm]d represents the d-th element of θ
k
m. If we define N k∗n (d) := Nn −N k+n −N k−n as the set
of the remaining indexes, the Byzantine-resilient update of dimension d corresponding to (8) is
[θk+1n ]d =
1
Nn +Bn − 2qn + 1
∑
m∈Nk∗n (d)∪{n}
[θkm]d + η
k[gkn(θ
k
n)]d, (11)
where [θ]d represents the d-th element of θ. The proposed Byzantine-resilient decentralized TD(λ)
with linear function approximation, abbreviated as Byrd-TD(λ), is summarized in Algorithm 1.
While the trimmed mean has been used in other Byzantine-resilient algorithms (Blanchard et al.,
2017; Yang and Bajwa, 2019; Guo et al., 2020), most of them cannot give a finite-time upper bound
of consensus and convergence rate. All of them require either the gradient of the objective function or
its unbiased stochastic estimate. The most relevant works Yang and Bajwa (2019) and Vaidya (2012)
are GD-based. This makes our analysis of Byrd-TD(λ) nontrivial.
3. Theoretical Analysis
In this section, we first provide some important properties of TD(λ), and then establish the conver-
gence and consensus analysis for Byrd-TD(λ).
3.1 Stationary Point and Asymptotic Properties
In the TD(λ) recursion given by (5), a stationary point of {θk} leads the increment to be 0. For the
decentralized case, we characterize the stationary point first in terms of function value and then in
5
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terms of parameter. To do so, for any θ ∈ RD, define the global increment as
g¯k(θ) :=
1
N
∑
n∈N
gkn(θ) =
1
N
∑
n∈N
(
rkn + (γφ(s
k+1)− φ(sk))>θ
)
zk (12)
= Akθ + b¯k, (13)
where gkn is given by (7), and the coefficients A
k and b¯k are given by
Ak := zk
(
γφ(sk+1)− φ(sk)
)>
and b¯k :=
1
N
∑
n∈N
rknz
k. (14)
Observe that Ak and b¯k are both determined by the state trajectory {s0, s1, · · · , sk} generated
from the Markov chain. Therefore, to characterize the stationarity of {g¯k(θ)}, we require the Markov
chain to satisfy the following assumption.
Assumption 1 (Markov chain) The Markov chain is irreducible and aperiodic.
As highlighted in (Tsitsiklis and Van Roy, 1997), Assumption 1 guarantees the existence of the
stationary distribution ρ of state sk and the expectation limits of Ak and b¯k, as
lim
k→∞
E[Ak] = A∗ and lim
k→∞
E[b¯k] = b¯∗. (15)
Therefore, the expectation limit of the global increment can be defined as
g¯∗(θ) := A∗θ + b¯∗ such that lim
k→∞
E[g¯k(θ)] = g¯∗(θ). (16)
It has been shown that A∗ and b¯∗ have explicit expressions and A∗ is a negative definite matrix
(Tsitsiklis and Van Roy, 1997). In addition, A∗ and b¯∗ will be attracted to their limits at a geometric
mixing rate (Doan et al., 2019; Bhandari et al., 2018). These properties are the cornerstones of our
analysis that will be presented in the supplementary material.
If there exists θ∞λ ∈ RD such that g¯∗(θ∞λ ) = 0, we say that θ∞λ is a stationary point. We will
show that our proposed Byrd-TD(λ) converges to a neighborhood of θ∞λ due to Byzantine attacks.
Note that although we can solve (3) with either gradient descent or TD(λ), their stationary points are
different. The stationary point of gradient descent minimizes F (θ), while in TD(λ), different λ leads
to different F (θ∞λ ) because the function g¯
∗(θ) depends on λ. This is one of the major challenges in
analyzing Byrd-TD(λ). It has been shown in (Tsitsiklis and Van Roy, 1997) that θ∞λ satisfies
min
θ
F (θ) ≤ F (θ∞λ ) ≤ 1− γλ
1− γ minθ F (θ). (17)
Larger λ usually leads to smaller approximation error of θ∞λ in the original TD(λ). However, as we
can see later, this does not necessarily hold when confronting with the Byzantine agents.
Denote the filtration containing all the information up to time k by Fk = {s0, s1, · · · , sk}. Unlike
the analysis of stochastic optimization, the conditional expectation of g¯k(θ) is usually not equal to
g¯∗(θ) even when k is large enough, because the conditional probability P(sk+1 = s|Fk) is not equal
to the stationary probability P(sk+1 = s) even when k goes to infinity. As a result, g¯k(θ) is a bias
estimator of g¯∗(θ). This brings another of the major challenges in utilizing the classical analytical
tools of stochastic optimization to establish the convergence of Byrd-TD(λ). To overcome this issue,
we resort to the geometric mixing time of Markov chain (Bre´maud, 2013).
3.2 Main Results
Before starting the analysis, we introduce several assumptions.
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Assumption 2 (Bounded reward variation) For any transition from s to s′, variation of the local
reward at every honest agent with respect to the global reward is upper-bounded by
1
N
∑
n∈N
∥∥∥Rn(s, s′)− 1
N
∑
n∈N
Rn(s, s′)
∥∥∥2 ≤ δ2. (18)
The quantity δ2 in Assumption 2 is the measurement of agent heterogeneity. When all agents have
access to the global reward, δ2 is equal to 0. As we will demonstrate in the analysis, a large δ2
increases the difficulty of defending against the Byzantine attacks.
Assumption 3 (Normalized features) Features have been normalized such that ‖φ(s)‖ ≤ 1, ∀s ∈ S.
Assumption 3 is standard in analyzing the TD-family algorithms (Doan et al., 2019; Bhandari
et al., 2018; Srikant and Ying, 2019).
We need an additional assumption on the network topology. Consider a set HG with cardinality
HG = |HG | whose elements are the subgraphs of G obtained by removing all Byzantine agents with
their edges, and removing any additional qn incoming edges at every honest node n.
Assumption 4 (Network connectivity) For any subgraph G′ ∈ HG, there exists at least one agent n∗
which has directed paths to all nodes in G′. The length of these directed paths is no more than τG.
We call n∗ and τG as source node and network diameter, respectively. Examples of topologies that
satisfy Assumption 4 have been discussed in (Vaidya et al., 2012).
With these assumptions, we begin to establish our main results. We first show all models in {θkn}
will reach consensus albeit the Byzantine agents are biasing the learning process.
Theorem 1 Suppose Assumptions 1–4 hold and qn satisfies Bn ≤ qn < Nn3 . If we choose the
decreasing step size ηk in Algorithm 1 appropriately , and define θ¯k := 1N
∑
n∈N θ
k
n, then the consensus
error satisfies
1
N
∑
n∈N
∥∥∥θkn − θ¯k∥∥∥2 ≤ 1
2
C1µG
(
ηk−(k mod τGHG)
)2
. (19)
Therein, C1 is a positive constant independent with k and network topology, and µG is monotonically
increasing when the network diameter τG increases.
Theorem 1 implies that all honest agents eventually reach consensus, at the rate of O
(
(ηk)2
)
. A
smaller network diameter τG yields a faster convergence rate, as indicated by (19).
Next, we show that θkn on every honest agent n converges to a neighborhood of θ
∞
λ , the stationary
point of the TD(λ) recursion without Byzantine attacks.
Theorem 2 Suppose Assumptions 1–4 hold and qn satisfies Bn ≤ qn < Nn3 . If the step size ηk in
Algorithm 1 satisfies ηk = ηk+k0 , where k
0 > 0 is a sufficiently large integer and η > 0, then it holds
1
N
∑
n∈N
E‖θk+1n − θ∞λ ‖2 ≤ C1µG
(
η
k − (k mod τGHG) + k0
)2
+
C2
(k + k0)
+ C3ϕ(k) + C4
DGδ2
(1− γλ)2 (20)
where  := σminη2 , σmin is the smallest singular value of A
∗, C2, C3, and C4 are positive constants,
DG is the degree of network unsaturation defined as
DG :=
N
minn∈N {Nn +Bn − 2qn + 1} − 1, (21)
and the function ϕ(k) is defined as
ϕ(k) :=

2η
(− 1)2
(− 1) ln ((k + 1 + k0)/η)+ 1
k + 1 + k0
,  > 1,
η
ln
(
(k + k0)/η
)2
k + k0
,  = 1,
η
(
(1− ) ln (k0/η)− 1)
(k0 − 1)(1− )2
(
k0 − 1
k + k0
)
, 0 <  < 1.
(22)
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Theorem 2 asserts that θkn on every honest agent n converges to a neighborhood of θ
∞
λ , with the rate
dominated by the function ϕ(k). When  > 1, the algorithm converges at the rate of O(ln(k)/k),
which is consistent with the rate in (Bhandari et al., 2018). When  = 1, the algorithm converges at
the rate of O(ln(k)2/k), which is consistent with the rate in (Doan et al., 2019). When 0 <  < 1, the
algorithm converges at the rate of O(1/k). The radius of the neighborhood is bounded by a constant
O(DGδ2). To the best of our knowledge, this tight analysis is new.
In addition to the learning error caused by Byzantine attacks as shown in (20), the following
corollary gives the overall asymptotic learning error.
Corollary 1 Under the same condition as that in Theorem 2, the overall asymptotic learning error
of Algorithm 1 is bounded by
lim
k→∞
1
N
∑
n∈N
F (θk+1n ) ≤ 2C4 DGδ
2
(1− γλ)2 + 2
1− γλ
1− γ minθ F (θ). (23)
The first term at the right-hand side of (23) comes from the Byzantine attacks and the use of
trimmed mean, while the second term comes from the intrinsic error of linear approximation. Tuning
the parameter λ helps achieve the best accuracy.
Effect of network topology. The above analysis reveals that the network topology determines
the convergence rate and the asymptotic learning error. Two important topology-dependent parame-
ters are the network diameter τG and the degree of network unsaturation DG .
The dependence on the network diameter τG has been shown in Theorem 1. On the other hand,
the asymptotic learning error is proportional to DG . For DG in (21), we observe that the denominator
of its first term is minn∈N {Nn + Bn − 2qn + 1}, which corresponds to the bottleneck of the network
with the smallest number of honest in-neighbors. Therefore, we encourage every honest agent n to
choose an appropriate qn, large enough to defend against all Byzantine neighbors (qn ≥ Bn), but not
too large such that DG is sufficiently small. When the number of Byzantine agents B is finite, the
number of honest agents N goes to infinity, and the network is complete, the degree of saturation is
sufficiently high. In this case, DG goes to 0, and so as the asymptotic learning error. On the contrary,
when the network is sparse, minn∈N {Nn + Bn − 2qn + 1} becomes a small constant, such that DG
and the asymptotic learning error are both O(N). In short, dense networks are easier for learning the
value function in terms of both consensus and learning error. However, more communication links
lead to more communication burden, leaving a trade-off for network designers.
Selection of parameter λ. According to the original TD(λ) analysis, λ balances the approxi-
mation accuracy and the convergence rate. As demonstrated in (17), λ = 1 leads to the best approx-
imation value, while λ = 0 leads to the fastest convergence rate. Due to the existence of Byzantine
attacks, the influence of λ becomes more complicated in the proposed Byrd-TD(λ). At the right-hand
side of (23), when λ increases from 0 to 1, the first term increases but the second term decreases. Re-
call that δ2 is the measurement of reward heterogeneity and DG is the degree of network unsaturation.
We suggest to choose a small λ if the reward heterogeneity is strong or the network is unsaturated.
4. Numerical Experiments
We test the proposed Byrd-TD(λ) on the cooperative navigation task that modifies the one in (Lowe
et al., 2017). The goal of every agent is to cover its target landmark. An agent’s local reward is
computed by calculating the distance between itself and its target landmark and, is further penalized
if it collides with other agents. In every step, an agent chooses an action among {up, left, right, down}
according to its policy. The local reward of each agent depends on the distance between the agent
and its goal landmark, and will be penalized if the agent collides with others. Each agent does not
know others’ landmarks, and thus the local reward functions are kept private. Unlike the task in
(Lowe et al., 2017), where every agent does not have a specific target landmark but has access to all
local rewards, our setting is fully decentralized. The policy to be evaluated is uniform random. The
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Figure 2: MSBE and MCE×k/ ln(k) versus step k under different λ in a complete network.
performance metrics are the mean squared Bellman error (MSBE) and the mean consensus error (MCE).
At every step, every honest agent has a local squared Bellman error (SBE) defined as
SBE
({θkn}Nn=1, sk) := 1N ∑
n∈N
(
Vθkn(s
k)−
∑
s′∈S
P(sk, s′)(Rn(sk, s′) + γVθkn(s′))
)2
, (24)
and a local consensus error (CE) defined as
CE
({θkn}Nn=1) := 1N ∑
n∈N
‖θkn − θ¯k‖2. (25)
MSBE and MCE are calculated by averaging the local SBEs and CEs over all honest agents and all
previous steps, respectively, given by
MSBE :=
1
k
k∑
κ=1
SBE
({θκn}Nn=1, sκ) and MCE := 1k
k∑
κ=1
CE
({θκn}Nn=1) (26)
Byzantine-resilience. We compare four algorithms: mean and trim refer to that the honest
agents update their parameters via mean and trimmed mean using their neighboring parameters
without Byzantine attacks, respectively; mean-attack and trim-attack refer to those under Byzantine
attacks. That is, mean and mean-attack correspond to the original decentralized TD(λ), while trim
and trim-attack correspond to Byrd-TD(λ). We consider sign flipping attacks here. We examine
the impact of different λ. For λ = 0, 0.3, 0.6, the step size is ηk = 0.1√
k
. For λ = 0.9, the step size
is ηk = 0.05√
k
. The first underlying network is complete, with 7 honest and 2 Byzantine agents, and
qn = 2. The second is an Erdos-Renyi network with 9 agents. Every pair of agents are neighbors
with probability 0.7, and every agent is Byzantine with probability 0.2. We set qn as the number of
Byzantine agents. A total of 10 random Erdos-Renyi graphs are generated to calculate the averaged
MSBE and MCE. The Byzantine agents are normal in mean and trim, but adopt sign flipping attacks in
mean-attack and trim-attack. Here, sign flipping attacks mean that Byzantine agents send negative
values of their true parameters to its neighbors.
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Figure 3: MSBE and MCE×k/ ln(k) versus step k under different λ in an Erdos-Renyi network.
As shown in Figures 2 and 3, when the Byzantine agents are absent, decentralized TD(λ) with mean
and trimmed mean aggregation rules both work well. At presence of Byzantine attacks, decentralized
TD(λ) with mean aggregation fails, but the proposed trimmed mean aggregation rule is still robust.
With particular note, as predicted by Theorem 1, CE is in the order of O((ηk)2) = O( 1k ), such that
MCE is in the order of O( 1k
∑k
κ=1(η
κ)2) = O(ln(k)/k) and MCE×k/ ln(k) becomes a horizontal line
asymptotically. Our numerical experiments corroborate this theoretical result.
H2B1 H3B1
Figure 4: Each honest agent has one Byzantine
neighbor.
Network topology. We test the algorithms
over different topologies. We have presented
the performance in complete and Erdos-Renyi
graphs under sign flipping attacks in Figures 2
and 3. In Figures 5 and 6, we test the algo-
rithm in several decentralized networks shown in
Figure 4. In these experiments, qn = 1. For
λ = 0, 0.3, 0.6, the step size is set as ηk = 0.1√
k
.
For λ = 0.9, ηk = 0.05√
k
. Byzantine agents are
normal in mean and trim, but adopt sign flip-
ping attacks in mean-attack and trim-attack.
Different Byzantine attacks. The robustness of the algorithms has been tested under different
attacks. In Figures 7 and 8, we test same value and Gaussian noise attacks in the Erdos-Renyi graph.
With same value attacks, Byzantine agents always share zero vectors. In Gaussian noise attacks, each
Byzantine agent shares a randomly picked honest agent’s parameter, polluted with Gaussian noise
(with mean 0 and standard deviation 1). For λ = 0, 0.3, 0.6, the step size is set as ηk = 0.1√
k
. For
λ = 0.9, ηk = 0.05√
k
. A total of 5 random Erdos-Renyi graphs are generated to calculate the averaged
MSBE and MCE. In these experiments, qn is set to be the number of Byzantine agents in the graph.
5. Conclusions
This paper deals with temporal-difference learning in the MARL problem and proposes a novel
Byzantine-resilient decentralized TD(λ) with linear function approximation. We establish the finite-
time convergence rate and asymptotic learning error in the presence of Byzantine attacks. We show
that the asymptotic learning error is determined by the variation of local rewards and the degree of
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Figure 5: MSBE and MCE under sign flipping attacks in H2B1 network shown in Figure 4.
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Figure 6: MSBE and MCE under sign flipping attacks in H3B1 network shown in Figure 4.
network unsaturation. Numerical experiments corroborate the robustness of the proposed algorithm.
Future work includes adaptively estimating the upper bound on the number of Byzantine agents.
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Figure 8: MSBE and MCE under Gaussian noise attacks in Erdos-Renyi graph.
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Supplementary Material
In this supplementary document, we will present our proofs via the following four steps:
1. Review the existing convergence results of centralized TD(λ) (Section A).
2. Establish the convergence of decentralized TD(λ) over a time-varying directed graph (Section B).
3. Show that Byrd-TD(λ) is a special case of decentralized TD(λ) over a time-varying directed graph,
and apply the convergence results in Section B to the proposed Byrd-TD(λ) (Section C).
4. Prove some supporting lemmas (Section D).
Appendix A. Convergence of Centralized TD(λ)
In these section, we will show the convergence rate of centralized TD(λ).
To make the proof self-contained, we give the explicit expressions of A∗ and b¯∗ defined in (15); see
(Tsitsiklis and Van Roy, 1997). Let {sk} be the Markov chain defined by the underlying MRP, where
sk ∈ S has a transition probability matrix P ∈ R|S|×|S|, with (s, s′)-th entry being P(s, s′). We have
A∗ := Φ>D(U− I)Φ, b¯∗ := Φ>D
∞∑
κ=0
λκ(γP)κ+1r∗, (27)
where Φ and U are defined by
Φ := [φ(1),φ(2), · · · ,φ(s), · · · ,φ(|S|)]> ∈ R|S|×D, (28)
U := (1− λ)
∞∑
κ=0
λκ(γP)κ+1 ∈ R|S|×|S|, (29)
and the s-th element of vector r∗ ∈ R|S| is defined by
[r∗]s :=
∑
s′∈S
P(s, s′)R¯(s, s′). (30)
As we have discussed in Section 3.1, one key challenge of analyzing TD(λ) is its biased update.
To overcome this challenge, we turn to the concept of mixing time of Markov chain.
Definition 1 Given a constant η > 0, we denote by τ(η) the mixing time of the Markov chain, given
by
‖E[Ak −A∗|Fk−τ(η)]‖ ≤ η, ∀k ≥ τ(η), (31)
‖E[b¯k − b¯∗|Fk−τ(η)]‖ ≤ η, ∀k ≥ τ(η). (32)
Assumption 1 guarantees the Markov chain mixes at a geometric mixing rate, which means that there
exists a constant C such that for any given small constant η, τ(η) is bounded by
τ(η) ≤ C ln(1/η). (33)
In the following theorem, we restate the convergence results derived in (Doan et al., 2019).
Theorem 3 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 3 hold. If we use step size ηk = ηk+k0 with large enough k
0,
then given θ, the error after taking one step TD(λ) follows from the two cases.
Case 1. When k ≥ τ(ηk), it holds
E[‖θ + ηkg¯k(θ)− θ∞λ ‖2] ≤ (1− σminηk)‖θ − θ∞λ ‖2 + 2C6(ηk)2C ln(
k + 1
η
). (34)
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Case 2. When k < τ(ηk), it holds
‖θ + ηkg¯k(θ)− θ∞λ ‖2
≤2
(
1 + ηk
(
1 + γ
1− γλ
))2
‖θ − θ∞λ ‖2 + 2(ηk)2
((
1 + γ
1− γλ
)
‖θ∞λ ‖+
(
Rmax
1− γλ
))2
, (35)
where Rmax := maxs,s′∈S R¯(s, s′) is the maximum reward, and the constants are defined as
C5 := 4
(
36 +
(229 + 42Rmax)(1 + γ)
2
(1− γλ)2
)
, (36)
C6 := ‖θ∞λ ‖2C5 + 2
(
32R2max + 2‖θ∞λ ‖2 + 1
)
+
4
(
25R2max + 16(Rmax + 1)
3 + 50(Rmax + ‖θ∞λ ‖2)2
)
(1 + γ)2
(1− γλ)2 . (37)
Appendix B. Decentralized TD(λ) over a time-varying directed graph
To analyze Byrd-TD(λ), we first establish the convergence of decentralized TD(λ) over a time-varying
directed graph, which by itself is new, and can be of independent interest.
With the trimmed mean aggregation of Byrd-TD(λ), every agent discards some messages that may
come from different agents at different times k. As a result, the underlying communication graph is
essentially a directed and time-varying subgraph of G. Before proving our main results, we introduce
several notations. Similar to Section 3.1, we also write (7) in a linear form
gkn(θ) = A
kθ + bkn, (38)
where bkn := r
k
nz
k satisfies 1N
∑
n∈N b
k
n = b¯
k
n. We can verify that the global increment g¯
k(θ) is the
average of local increment gkn(θ), namely
g¯k(θ) =
1
N
∑
n∈N
gkn(θ). (39)
The TD(λ) update (8) can be expressed in a compact form. Stacking all θkn and g
k
n(θ
k
n), we have
Θk :=
[
θk1 ,θ
k
2 , · · · ,θkn, · · · ,θkN
]> ∈ RN×D, (40)
Gk(Θk) :=
[
gk1 (θ
k
1 ), g
k
2 (θ
k
2 ), · · · , gkn(θkn), · · · , gkN (θkN )
]> ∈ RN×D. (41)
Thus, the matrix form of (8) can be expressed as
Θk+1 = Y˜Θk + ηkGk(Θk), (42)
where Y˜ ∈ RN×N and [Y˜]nm = 1Nn+Bn+1 for m ∈ Nn. Similarly, we will define a counterpart of Y˜
for the time-varying network, which serves as a stepping stone to write the update of TD(λ) over a
time-varying network in a matrix form. Suppose the d-th element of θkn in agent n can be broadcast
to other agents through a subgraph Gk(d) := (N ∪ B, Ek(d)) of G, where Ek(d) ⊆ E . We use Θkd and
Gkd to represent the d-th columns of Θ
k and Gk, respectively.
In addition, if we can define a proper matrix Yk(d) ∈ RN×N , such that [Yk(d)]nm > 0 if and only
if (n,m) ∈ Ek(d), the update of TD(λ) over a time-varying directed graph can be written as
Θk+1d = Y
k(d)Θkd + η
kGkd(Θ
k). (43)
Before describing the properties of Yk(d), we introduce the following definition.
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Definition 2 (Stochastic vector and row-stochastic matrix) A vector x is termed a stochastic vector
if all its elements are in the range [0, 1] and sum up to 1. A matrix is termed a row-stochastic matrix
if all its rows are stochastic vectors.
Similar to (Vaidya, 2012, Claim 2), it can be proved that if Yk(d) satisfies the following six condi-
tions, the consensus and convergence of TD(λ) over a time-varying directed graph can be guaranteed.
c1. Yk(d) is a row-stochastic matrix.
c2. [Yk(d)]nn =
1
Nn+Bn−2qn+1 for all n ∈ N .
c3. [Yk(d)]nm 6= 0 only if (m,n) ∈ E or n = m.
c4. At least Nn−qn+1 elements in the n-th row of Yk(d) are lower bounded by the constant µ0 > 0.
c5. All elements in Yk(d) are upper bounded by 1minn∈N {Nn+Bn−2qn+1} .
c6. There exists one column in (Yk(d))τG such that all elements in this column are non-zero and the
there exist no more than HG types of Yk(d).
With (c1)–(c6), we can derive the consensus rate of TD(λ) over a time-varying directed network.
Theorem 4 Suppose Assumptions 1–3, Condition (c1)–(c6) of Yk(d) hold and qn satisfies Bn ≤
qn <
Nn
3 . If we choose the decreasing step size η
k in Algorithm 1 appropriately satisfying
2τGHG+5N2(
1 + γ
1− γλ )
2(ηk)2 ≤ 1− µ
2
2
and 1 ≤
(
ηk−1
ηk
)2
≤
(
3− µ2
2
) 1
τGHG
, (44)
then the consensus error satisfies
1
N
∑
n∈N
∥∥θkn − θ¯k∥∥2 ≤ 12C1µG (ηk−(k mod τGHG))2 , (45)
where the convergence coefficient µG and constant C1 are defined as
µG := 2τGHG
(
1 +
2− µ2
(1− µ2)2
)
3− µ2
1− µ2 τGHG and C1 :=
64N2δ2
(1− γλ)2 . (46)
Theorem 1 implies that all agents eventually reach consensus, at the rate of O
(
(ηk)2
)
.
Next, we show that θkn on every agent n converges to a neighborhood of the fixed point θ
∞
λ .
Theorem 5 Suppose Assumptions 1–3, Condition (c1)–(c6) of Yk(d) hold and qn satisfies Bn ≤
qn <
Nn
3 . If the step size η
k in Algorithm 1 satisfies ηk = ηk+k0 , where k
0 > 0 is a sufficiently large
number such that step size ηk satisfies the condition (44) and η > 0, then it holds
1
N
∑
n∈N
E‖θk+1n − θ∞λ ‖2 ≤ C1µG
(
η
k − (k mod τGHG) + k0
)2
+
C2
(k + k0)
+ C3ϕ(k) + C4
DGδ2
(1− γλ)2 (47)
where DG and the function ϕ(k) have been defined in (21) and (22), respectively.
Theorems 4 and 5 are the corner stones to prove Theorems 1 and 2, respectively. The key to
prove Theorems 1 and 2 is to show the effect of trimmed mean in Byrd-TD(λ) can be described by a
well-defined matrix Yk(d) satisfying (c1)–(c6).
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B.1 Construction of auxiliary variable Θˆk
The lack of consensus of θk+1n in the initial stage brings difficulty to our proof. Therefore, we look for
a variable ωk ∈ RD, for which all θk+1n will converge to.
To gain insights for the construction of ωk, we expand (43) as
Θkd = Y
k−1(d)Θk−1d + η
k−1Gk−1d (Θ
k)
= Yk−1(d)Yk−2(d) · · ·Y0(d)Θ0d +
k−1∑
κ=0
Yk−1(d)Yk−2(d) · · ·Yκ+1(d)ηκGκd(Θκ)
= Y¯k−10 (d)Θ
0
d +
k−1∑
κ=0
Y¯k−1κ+1(d)η
κGκd(Θ
κ), (48)
where the transition matrix Y¯kk0(d) is defined as the product of a series of Y
k(d), as
Y¯kk0(d) := Y
k(d)Yk−1(d) · · ·Yk0(d). (49)
The following lemma shows the limit of Y¯kk0(d) exists.
Lemma 1 For any possible series {Yk(d)} satisfying Condition (c1)–(c6), the limit of Y¯kk0(d) exists,
denoted as 1p>k0(d), and Y¯
k
k0
(d) converges to its limit at linear rate, such that
lim
k→∞
Y¯kk0(d) = 1p
>
k0(d), (50)
‖Y¯kk0(d)− 1p>k0(d)‖2F ≤ N2µ
2b k−k0+1τGHG c, (51)
where all elements in pk0(d) are within
[
0, 1minn∈N {Nn+Bn−2qn+1}
]
and pk0(d) is a stochastic vector.
With Lemma 1, we introduce a matrix Θˆk := 1(ωk)> and a vector Θˆkd := [ω
k]d1, where [ω
k]d
is the d-th element of ωk ∈ RD, The vector Θˆkd asymptotically approximates the sequence Θkd, and
satisfies the following recursion
[ωk]d :=p
>
0 (d)Θˆ
0
d +
k−1∑
κ=0
p>κ+1(d)η
κGκd(Θˆ
κ). (52)
With the auxiliary variable ωk and Θˆk, we can begin our proofs of Theorems 4 and 5.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 4
Because ‖θkn − θ¯k‖2 can be bounded by ‖Θk − Θˆk‖2F as
1
N
∑
n∈N
‖θkn − θ¯k‖2 =
1
N
∑
n∈N
‖θkn − ωk‖2 − ‖ωk − θ¯k‖2
≤ 1
N
‖Θk − Θˆk‖2F . (53)
Therefore, we will bound ‖θkn − θ¯k‖2 by analyzing ‖Θk − Θˆk‖2F .
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In order to see the rate of Θk converging to Θˆk, we first give the bound of difference as
‖Θk − Θˆk‖2F =
D∑
d=1
‖Θkd − Θˆkd‖2
=
D∑
d=1
‖(Y¯k−10 (d)− 1p>0 (d))Θ0d +
k−1∑
κ=0
(
Y¯k−1(d, κ+ 1)− 1p>κ+1(d)
)
ηκGκd(Θ
κ)‖2
≤2
D∑
d=1
‖(Y¯k−10 (d)− 1p>0 (d))Θ0d‖2 + 2
D∑
d=1
k−1∑
κ=0
‖ (Y¯k−1κ+1(d)− 1p>κ+1(d)) ηκGκd(Θκ)‖2. (54)
Since both Y¯k−1κ (d) and 1p
>
κ (d) are row-stochastic matrices, we have(
Y¯k−1κ (d)− 1p>κ (d)
)
1 = 0, (55)
which implies that the first term of (54) can be bounded by
2
D∑
d=1
‖(Y¯k−10 (d)− 1p>0 (d))Θ0d‖2 = 2
D∑
d=1
‖(Y¯k−10 (d)− 1p>0 (d))(Θ0d − ω0d1)‖2
≤2
D∑
d=1
‖Y¯k−10 (d)− 1p>0 (d)‖2‖Θ0d − ω0d1‖2 ≤ 2
D∑
d=1
N2µ
2b kτGHG c‖Θ0d − ω0d1‖2
=2N2µ
2b kτGHG c‖Θ0 − Θˆ0‖2F = 0, (56)
where the last equality is from Θˆ0 = Θ0.
The second term of (54) can be bounded by
2
D∑
d=1
k−1∑
κ=0
‖ (Y¯k−1κ+1(d)− 1p>κ+1(d)) ηκGκd(Θκ)‖2
=2
D∑
d=1
k−1∑
κ=0
‖ (Y¯k−1κ+1(d)− 1p>κ+1(d)) ηκ(Gκd(Θκ)− [g¯κ(ωκ)]d1)‖2
≤2
D∑
d=1
k−1∑
κ=0
‖Y¯k−1κ+1(d)− 1p>κ+1(d)‖2‖ηκ(Gκd(Θκ)− [g¯κ(ωκ)]d1)‖2
≤2
k−1∑
κ=0
N2µ
b k−κ−1τGHG c
D∑
d=1
‖ηκ(Gκd(Θκ)− [g¯κ(ωκ)]d1)‖2
=2N2
k−1∑
κ=0
µ
b k−κ−1τGHG c(ηκ)2‖Gκ(Θκ)− 1g¯κ(ωκ)>‖2F . (57)
Note that the right-hand side (RHS) of (57) is the difference between the local and global incre-
ments, which will be bounded in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 For any local model θn and any model θ
′, the difference between local and global increment
is upper bounded by
1
N
∑
n∈N
‖gkn(θn)− g¯k(θ′)‖2 ≤ 2
(
1 + γ
1− γλ
)2
1
N
∑
n∈N
‖θn − θ′‖2 + 2δ
2
(1− γλ)2 . (58)
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With Lemma 2, the last term of (57) can be bounded further by
‖Gκ(Θκ)− 1g¯κ(ωκ)>‖2F =
∑
n∈N
‖gκn(θκn)− g¯κ(ωκ)‖2
≤2
(
1 + γ
1− γλ
)2 ∑
n∈N
‖θκn − ωκ‖2 +
2Nδ2
(1− γλ)2
≤2
(
1 + γ
1− γλ
)2
‖Θκ − Θˆκ‖2F +
2Nδ2
(1− γλ)2 . (59)
Plugging (56), (57) and (59) into (54), we have
‖Θk − Θˆk‖2F ≤2N2
k−1∑
κ=0
µ
b k−κ−1τGHG c(ηκ)2
(
2(
1 + γ
1− γλ )
2‖Θκ − Θˆκ‖2F +
2Nδ2
(1− γλ)2
)
=
4N3δ2
(1− γλ)2
k−1∑
κ=0
µ
b k−κ−1τGHG c(ηκ)2 + 4N2(
1 + γ
1− γλ )
2
k−1∑
κ=0
µ
b k−κ−1τGHG c(ηκ)2‖Θκ − Θˆκ‖2F . (60)
We can respectively, bound the two terms in the RHS of (60) in the following two lemmas, whose
proofs are deferred to Section D.
Lemma 3 When the step size ηk in Algorithm 1 satisfies condition (44), the following summation
has an upper bound
k−1∑
κ=0
µ
2b k−κ−1τGHG c(ηκ)2 ≤
(
1 +
2− µ2
(1− µ2)2
)
τGHG(ηk−k mod τGHG )2. (61)
Lemma 4 When the step size ηk satisfies (44) and the sequence {‖Θk − Θˆk‖2F } satisfies
‖Θk − Θˆk‖2F ≤
4N3Dδ2
(1− γλ)2
(
1 +
2− µ2
(1− µ2)2
)
τGHG(ηk−h(k))2
+ 4N2(
1 + γ
1− γλ )
2
k−1∑
κ=0
µ
2b k−κτGHG c(ηκ)2‖Θκ − Θˆκ‖2F , (62)
then ‖Θk − Θˆk‖2F has an upper bound
‖Θk − Θˆk‖2F ≤
N
2
C1µG(ηk−h(k))2. (63)
With Lemmas 3 and 4, we reach the following inequality
1
N
∑
n∈N
‖θkn − θ¯k‖2 ≤
1
N
‖Θk − Θˆk‖2F ≤
1
2
C1µG(ηk−h(k))2, (64)
which completes the proof.
B.3 Proof of Theorem 5
By analyzing ‖θk+1n − θ∞λ ‖2, we find that
1
N
∑
n∈N
E‖θk+1n − θ∞λ ‖2
≤ 1
N
∑
n∈N
(
2E‖θk+1n − ωk+1‖2 + 2E‖ωk+1 − θ∞λ ‖2
)
=
2
N
E‖Θk+1 − Θˆk+1‖2F + 2E‖ωk+1 − θ∞λ ‖2. (65)
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Since ‖Θk+1 − Θˆk+1‖2F has been bounded in Lemma 4, we will proceed with ‖ωk+1 − θ∞λ ‖2.
To do so, note that [ωk]d in (52) can be expressed as
[ωk+1]d =[ω
k]d + p
>
k+1(d)η
kGkd(Θˆ
k), (66)
Observe that the update of [ωk]d has a similar form of the TD(λ) update, so that we can manage to
analyse its convergence with the techniques developed in the TD(λ) analysis. However, TD(λ) over
the decentralized and time-varying graph cannot reach a minimum of F (θ) like the original TD(λ).
This is our main challenge, comparing to the analysis in (Doan et al., 2019).
Stacking over all dimensions d, we have
‖ωk+1 − θ∞λ ‖2 =
D∑
d=1
(
[ωk+1]d − [θ∞λ ]d
)2
=
D∑
d=1
(
[ωk]d + p
>
k+1(d)η
kGkd(Θˆ
k)− [θ∞λ ]d
)2
=
D∑
d=1
(
[ωk]d +
1
N
1>ηkGkd(Θˆ
k)− [θ∞λ ]d + (pk+1(d)−
1
N
1)>ηkGkd(Θˆ
k)
)2
≤ 1
1− βk
D∑
d=1
(
[ωk]d +
1
N
1>ηkGkd(Θˆ
k)− [θ∞λ ]d
)2
+
1
βk
D∑
d=1
(
(pk+1(d)− 1
N
1)>ηkGkd(Θˆ
k)
)2
=
1
1− βk ‖ω
k + ηkg¯k(ωk)− θ∞λ ‖2 +
1
βk
D∑
d=1
(
(pk+1(d)− 1
N
1)>ηkGkd(Θˆ
k)
)2
, (67)
where the inequality comes from (x+ y)2 ≤ x2
1−βk +
y2
βk
for any 0 < βk < 1 and the last equality comes
from the fact that 1N 1
>Gk(Θˆk) = 1N
∑
n∈N g
k
n(ω
k) = g¯k(ωk).
We first bound the second term at the RHS of (67). With Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, it holds
D∑
d=1
∣∣∣∣(pk+1(d)− 1N 1)>ηkGkd(Θˆk)
∣∣∣∣2
=
D∑
d=1
∣∣∣∣(pk+1(d)− 1N 1)>ηk (Gkd(Θˆk)− [g¯k(ωk)]d1)
∣∣∣∣2
≤(ηk)2
D∑
d=1
‖pk+1(d)− 1
N
1‖2‖Gkd(Θˆk)− [g¯k(ωk)]d1‖2, (68)
where the equality comes from the fact that (pk+1(d) − 1N 1)>1 = 0. From Lemma 1, it follows
that pk0(d) is a stochastic vector and the elements of pk0(d) are within
[
0, 1minn∈N {Nn+Bn−2qn+1}
]
.
Therefore, the first term in (68) has a uniform upper bound∥∥∥pk+1(d)− 1
N
1
∥∥∥2 ≤ 1
minn∈N {Nn +Bn − 2qn + 1} −
1
N
. (69)
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With this inequality, the RHS of (68) can be bounded by
(ηk)2
D∑
d=1
‖pk+1(d)− 1
N
1‖2
∥∥∥Gkd(Θˆk)− g¯kd(ωk)1∥∥∥2
≤(ηk)2
D∑
d=1
∥∥∥Gkd(Θˆk)− g¯kd(ωk)1∥∥∥2( 1minn∈N {Nn +Bn − 2qn + 1} − 1N
)
=(ηk)2‖Gk(Θˆk)− 1g¯k(ωk)>‖2F
(
1
minn∈N {Nn +Bn − 2qn + 1} −
1
N
)
≤(ηk)2 2Nδ
2
(1− γλ)2
(
1
minn∈N {Nn +Bn − 2qn + 1} −
1
N
)
=(ηk)2
2DGδ2
(1− γλ)2 , (70)
where DG was defined in (21) and the last inequality comes from Lemma 2 that
‖Gk(Θˆk)− 1g¯k(ωk)>‖2F =
∑
n∈N
‖gkn(ωk)− g¯k(ωk)‖2 ≤
2Nδ2
(1− γλ)2 . (71)
With (68) and (70), (67) becomes
‖ωk+1 − θ∞λ ‖2 ≤
1
1− βk ‖ω
k + ηkg¯k(ωk)− θ∞λ ‖2 +
(ηk)2
βk
2DGδ2
(1− γλ)2 . (72)
The first term at the RHS of (72) can be bounded in terms of E‖ωk − θ∞λ ‖2 by Theorem 3, and
the following lemma bounds the sequence {E‖ωk − θ∞λ ‖2}.
Lemma 5 If {ωk} is the sequence generated by (66), the expected optimal gap can be bounded by
E‖ωk − θ∞λ ‖2 ≤
C2
2
(
1
k + k0
)
+ 4C6Cϕ(k) +
8
σ2min
DGδ2
(1− γλ)2 . (73)
Together with Lemma 4, we can use (65) to present the convergence rate of θkn as
1
N
∑
n∈N
E‖θk+1n − θ∞λ ‖2
≤ 2
N
E‖Θk+1 − Θˆk+1‖2F + 2E‖ωk+1 − θ∞λ ‖2
≤C1µG(ηk−(k mod τGHG))2 + C2
(k + k0)
+ 8C6Cϕ(k) +
16
σ2min
DGδ2
(1− γλ)2 . (74)
By defining C3 := 8C6C and C4 :=
16
σ2min
, we complete the proof.
Appendix C. Consensus and Convergence of Byrd-TD(λ)
In Section B, we have shown that when the topology Yk(d) satisfies Conditions (c1)–(c6), TD(λ) over
a time-varying directed graphs guarantees consensus and convergence at the same time.
Now we will show that the trimmed mean aggregation in Byrd-TD(λ) can be described by (43) with
Yk(d) satisfying Conditions (c1)–(c6). Therefore, Theorems 4 and 5 can be applied to Byrd-TD(λ).
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C.1 Construction of Yk(d)
The way we construct Yk(d) ∈ RN×N is related to but different from that in (Vaidya, 2012), ensuring
a tighter convergence bound. We use Bk∗n (d) := |N k∗n (d) ∩ B| to denote the number of Byzantine
agents in N k∗n (d) and define N∗n := Nn +Bn − 2qn + 1 for simplicity.
Similar to (Vaidya, 2012), we construct Yk(d) under two different cases.
Case 1: agent n estimates the number of Byzantine neighbors correctly (qn − Bn +
Bk∗n (d) = 0).
Since both qn −Bn and Bk∗n (d) are larger than or equal to 0, the condition qn −Bn +Bk∗n (d) = 0
implies qn − Bn = 0 and Bk∗n (d) = 0, meaning that the honest agent n can estimate the number of
Byzantine neighbors correctly and eliminate all Byzantine neighbors. For any of honest neighbor m,
the weight should be chosen to 1Nn+Bn−2qn+1 . Hence, Y
k(d) can be constructed by
• If m = n or m ∈ N k∗n (d) ∩Nn, then
[Yk(d)]nm =
1
N∗n
. (75)
• Otherwise
[Yk(d)]nm = 0. (76)
The main different between our construction and that in (Vaidya, 2012) is the weights in Case 2.
Case 2: agent n estimates the number of Byzantine neighbors incorrectly (qn−Bn +
Bk∗n (d)>0).
When agent n overestimates or underestimates the number of Byzantine neighbors, we should
construct Yk(d) tactfully. We can verify that at least qn −Bn +Bk∗n (d) honest agents are contained
in both N k+n (d) and N k−n (d). Therefore, we define subsets Lk+n (d) ⊆ N k+n (d) and Lk−n (d) ⊆ N k−n (d)
where |Lk+n (d)| = |Lk−n (d)| = qn −Bn +Bk∗n (d).
When N k∗n (d) ∩ Bn 6= ∅ (then Bk∗n (d) 6= 0), for any nk+ ∈ Lk+n (d) and nk− ∈ Lk−n (d), for any
n′ ∈ N k∗n (d) ∩ Bn, the element [θkn′ ]d satisfies
[θknk+ ]d ≤ [θkn′ ]d ≤ [θknk− ]d. (77)
As a result, [θkn′ ]d can be expressed as
[θkn′ ]d = y(n
′, nk+)[θknk+ ]d + y(n
′, nk−)[θknk− ]d, (78)
where y(n′, nk+) and y(n′, nk−) are constants satisfying 0 ≤ y(n′, nk+), y(n′, nk−) ≤ 1 and y(n′, nk+)+
y(n′, nk−) = 1. In fact, y(n′, nk+) and y(n′, nk−) both depend on k and d, but we ignore the subscripts
for simplicity.
Similarly, we can decompose [θkn′ ]d for n
′ ∈ N k∗n (d) ∩Nn by
[θkn′ ]d =
(
1− qn −Bn
Nn +Bn − 2qn −Bk∗n (d)
)
[θkn′ ]d
+
qn −Bn
Nn +Bn − 2qn −Bk∗n (d)
(
y(n′, nk+)[θknk+ ]d + y(n
′, nk−)[θknk− ]d
)
. (79)
Inspired by this, we can construct Yk(d) as follows.
• If m = n, then
[Yk(d)]nm =
1
N∗n
. (80)
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• If m ∈ N k∗n (d) ∩Nn, then
[Yk(d)]nm =
(
1− qn −Bn
Nn +Bn − 2qn −Bk∗n (d)
)
1
N∗n
. (81)
• If m ∈ Lk+n (d), then
[Yk(d)]nm =
1
qn −Bn +Bk∗n (d)
∑
n′∈Nk∗n (d)∩Nn
y(n′,m)
1
N∗n
qn −Bn
Nn +Bn − 2qn −Bk∗n (d)
+
1
qn −Bn +Bk∗n (d)
∑
n′∈Nk∗n (d)∩Bn
y(n′,m)
1
N∗n
. (82)
• If m ∈ Lk−n (d), then
[Yk(d)]nm =
1
qn −Bn +Bk∗n (d)
∑
n′∈Nk∗n (d)∩Nn
y(n′,m)
1
N∗n
qn −Bn
Nn +Bn − 2qn −Bk∗n (d)
+
1
qn −Bn +Bk∗n (d)
∑
n′∈Nk∗n (d)∩Bn
y(n′,m)
1
N∗n
. (83)
• Otherwise
[Yk(d)]nm = 0. (84)
Therefore, we can write Byrd-TD(λ) update in the form of (43), and apply the results in Section
B.
C.2 Proofs of Theorems 1 and 2
Now the only thing we need to do for the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 is to verify that our constructed
Yk(d) satisfies Conditions (c1)–(c6) under Assumption 4.
Conditions (c1), (c2) and (c3) directly follow the similar results in (Vaidya, 2012, Claim 2). In
addition, the proofs of (c4) and (c5) for Case 1 are also simple.
We only show (c4) and (c5) for Case 2 and (c6) here.
Verification of (c4) for Case 2. In Case 2, because 0 ≤ 3qn < Nn, we have Bn ≤ qn < Nn+Bn−2qn
and then Bk∗n (d) ≤ min{Nn +Bn − 2qn, Bn} = Bn. As a result, it follows
qn −Bn
Nn +Bn − 2qn −Bk∗n (d)
≤ qn −Bn
Nn − 2qn . (85)
For m ∈ N k∗n (d) ∩Nn, we have
[Yk(d)]nm =
(
1− qn −Bn
Nn +Bn − 2qn −Bk∗n (d)
)
1
N∗n
≥ Nn +Bn − 3qn
Nn − 2qn
1
N∗n
(86)
For any m ∈ Lk+n (d) (or Lk−n (d)), there exists m′ ∈ Lk−n (d) (or Lk+n (d)), such that y(n′,m) +
y(n′,m′) = 1 and therefore at least one among y(n′,m) and y(n′,m′) is no less than 12 . Then at
least one among
∑
n′∈Nk∗n (d)∩Bn y(n
′,m) and
∑
n′∈Nk∗n (d)∩Bn y(n
′,m′) is larger than |N k∗n (d)∩Bn|/2.
Without loss of generality, we let
∑
n′∈Nk∗n (d)∩Bn y(n
′,m) is larger than |N k∗n (d) ∩ Bn|/2. Therefore,
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it holds
[Yk(d)]nm =
1
qn −Bn +Bk∗n (d)
∑
n′∈Nk∗n (d)∩Nn
y(n′,m)
1
N∗n
qn −Bn
Nn +Bn − 2qn −Bk∗n (d)
+
1
qn −Bn +Bk∗n (d)
∑
n′∈Nk∗n (d)∩Bn
y(n′,m)
1
N∗n
≥ 1
qn −Bn +Bk∗n (d)
qn −Bn
Nn +Bn − 2qn −Bk∗n (d)
∑
n′∈Nk∗n (d)
y(n′,m)
1
N∗n
≥ Nn +Bn − 2qn
Nn +Bn − 2qn −Bk∗n (d)
qn −Bn
qn −Bn +Bk∗n (d)
1
4N∗n
≥ (Nn +Bn − 2qn)(qn −Bn)
(Nn − qn)2
1
N∗n
, (87)
where the last inequality comes from 4(Nn +Bn − 2qn −Bk∗n (d))(qn −Bn +Bk∗n (d)) ≤ (Nn − qn)2.
As a result, in total Nn − qn + 1 elements have the lower bound µ0: Nn + Bn − 2qn − Bk∗n (d)
elements in N k∗n (d) ∩Nn, qn −Bn +Bk∗n (d) elements in Lk+n (d) or Lk−n (d), as well as the element n.
Verification of (c5) for Case 2. In Case 2, for m ∈ N k∗n (d) ∩Nn, we have
[Yk(d)]nm =
(
1− qn −Bn
Nn +Bn − 2qn −Bk∗n (d)
)
1
N∗n
≤ 1
N∗n
. (88)
For m ∈ Lk+n (d) or Lk−n (d), [Yk(d)]nm reaches its maximum when all y(n′,m) = 1, such that
[Yk(d)]nm =
1
qn −Bn +Bk∗n (d)
∑
n′∈Nk∗n (d)∩Nn
y(n′,m)
1
N∗n
qn −Bn
Nn +Bn − 2qn −Bk∗n (d)
+
1
qn −Bn +Bk∗n (d)
∑
n′∈Nk∗n (d)∩Bn
y(n′,m)
1
N∗n
≤ qn −Bn
qn −Bn +Bk∗n (d)
1
N∗n
+
Bk∗n (d)
qn −Bn +Bk∗n (d)
1
N∗n
=
1
N∗n
. (89)
Therefore Condition (c4) can be verified with constant
µ0 := min
n∈N
{
Nn +Bn − 3qn
Nn − 2qn ,
(Nn +Bn − 2qn)(qn −Bn)
(Nn − qn)2
}
× 1
Nn +Bn − 2qn + 1 . (90)
Verification of (c6). Note that Assumption 4 guarantees that any subgraph removing all agents in
W and any additional qn incoming edges at honest agent n has a source node n∗ and it can reach any
other agent within τG steps. Therefore, no element in the n∗-th column of matrix (Yk(d))τG is zero.
To show that there exist no more than HG types of Yk(d), we should notice that each Yk(d)
containing at least Nn− qn + 1 non-zero elements corresponding to a subgraph obtained by removing
all Byzantine agents with their edges, and removing any additional qn incoming edges at every honest
node n. Every such subgraph is contained in HG , whose cardinality is HG .
Now all conditions have been verified and Theorems 4 and 5 can be applied to Byrd-TD(λ).
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C.3 Proof of Corollary 1
Recall the definition of F (θ) as
F (θk+1n ) =
1
2
∑
s∈S
ρ(s)(φ(s)>θk+1n
≤1
2
∑
s∈S
ρ(s)[2(φ(s)>(θk+1n − θ∞λ ))2 + 2(φ(s)>θ∞λ − V(s))2]
=(θk+1n − θ∞λ )>Φc(θk+1n − θ∞λ ) + 2F (θ∞λ )
≤σc‖θk+1n − θ∞λ ‖2 + 2F (θ∞λ ), (91)
where the first inequality comes from the fact (x+ y)2 ≤ 2x2 + 2y2, Φc is defined by
Φc := Φ
>DΦ ∈ RD×D, (92)
and σc is the largest singular value of Φc.
Combining with (17), (91) implies the following bound
F (θk+1n ) ≤σc‖θk+1n − θ∞λ ‖2 + 2F (θ∞λ )
≤σc‖θk+1n − θ∞λ ‖2 + 2
1− γλ
1− γ minθ F (θ). (93)
Plugging (20) into (93), summing up over n ∈ N and taking limits on both sides of (93) yield
lim
k→∞
1
N
∑
n∈N
F (θk+1n ) ≤ lim
k→∞
1
N
∑
n∈N
σc‖θk+1n − θ∞λ ‖2 + 2F (θ∞λ )
≤2C4 DGδ
2
(1− γλ)2 + 2
1− γλ
1− γ minθ F (θ). (94)
This completes the proof.
Appendix D. Proof of Supporting Lemmas
In these section, we will prove some lemmas used before.
D.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Note that Condition (c6) guarantees that there exists at least one column of (Yk(d))τG , denoted as
the n∗-th column, being non-zero element-wise, and there exist no more than HG choices of Yk(d).
Therefore, at least one Y∗(d) appears more than τG times in the production Y¯k0+τGHG (d, k0) and there
exists at least one column of (Yk(d))τG , denoted as the n∗-th column, must be non-zero element-wise.
In addition, since all non-zero elements in Yk(d) are greater than µ0, all elements in the n
∗-th column
of Y¯k0+τGHG (d, k0) must be greater than µ
τGHG
0 .
Similar to (Vaidya, 2012, Lemma 3), when k > k0 + τGHG , for a row-stochastic matrix W, we
define
U1(W) := 1− min
n1,n2∈N
∑
m∈N
min{[W]n1m, [W]n2m}, (95)
then we can derive the following bound using the technique similar to (Vaidya, 2012, Lemma 4), as
U1(Y¯k0+(S+1)τGHG−1(d, k0 + SτGHG)) ≤ 1− µτGHG0 . (96)
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In addition, we can define another function U2(W) for a row-stochastic matrix W as
U2(W) := max
m∈N
max
n1,n2∈N
|[W]n1m − [W]n2m| . (97)
It is easy to see that all rows of matrix W are identical if and only if U1(W) = 0 or U2(W) = 0.
Additionally, (Hajnal and Bartlett, 1958) has shown that U1(W) and U2(W) satisfy
U2(
k∏
i=k0
Wi) ≤
k∏
i=k0
U1(Wi). (98)
We can see that U1(W) ≤ 1 and further conclude that
U2(Y¯kk0(d))
≤U1
(
Y¯k(d, k0 + bk − k0 + 1
τGHG
cτGHG)
) b k−k0+1τGHG c−1∏
s=0
U1(Y¯k0+(s+1)τGHG−1(d, k0 + sτGHG))
≤
b k−k0+1τGHG c−1∏
s=0
U1(Y¯k0+(s+1)τGHG−1(d, k0 + sτGHG)) ≤ µb
k−k0+1
τGHG c, (99)
where the last inequality comes from inequality (96) and µ is defined as
µ := 1− µτGHG0 . (100)
Hence, for any possible {Yk(d)}, the limit of Y¯kk0(d) exists, and Y¯kk0(d) converges to its limit at a
linear rate, given by
lim
k→∞
Y¯kk0(d) = 1p
>
k0(d), (101)
‖Y¯kk0(d)− 1p>k0(d)‖2F ≤ N2µ
2b k−k0+1τGHG c. (102)
Since all {Yk(d)} are row-stochastic matrices, pk0(d) is a stochastic vector as well. At the same
time, the elements of pk0(d) are bounded by the corresponding columns of Y
k0(d), such that
min
n∈N
[Yk0(d)]nm ≤ [pk0(d)]m ≤ max
n∈N
[Yk0(d)]nm. (103)
From Conditions (c1) and (c5), it follows that 0 ≤ [Yk0(d)]nm ≤ 1minn∈N {Nn+Bn−2qn+1} . Therefore,
the elements of pk0(d) are also bounded in
[
0, 1minn∈N {Nn+Bn−2qn+1}
]
. This completes the proof.
D.2 Proof of Lemma 2
From the definition in (4), zk has a bounded norm
‖zk‖ =
∥∥∥ k∑
κ=0
(γλ)k−κφ(sκ)
∥∥∥ ≤ k∑
κ=0
(γλ)k−κ‖φ(sκ)‖ ≤
k∑
κ=0
(γλ)k−κ ≤ 1
1− γλ, (104)
where the second inequality is the result of normalized features in Assumption 3. Observe from the
definitions in (14) that Ak has a bounded norm as well, given by
‖Ak‖ ≤‖zk(γφ(sk+1)− φ(sk))‖ ≤ ‖zk‖‖γφ(sk+1)− φ(sk)‖
≤‖zk‖(γ‖φ(sk+1)‖+ ‖φ(sk)‖) = 1 + γ
1− γλ, (105)
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and bkn has a bounded variation, given by
1
N
∑
n∈N
‖bkn − b¯k‖2 =
1
N
∑
n∈N
|rkn − r¯k|2‖zk‖2
≤ 1
N
∑
n∈N
|rkn − r¯kn|2
1
(1− γλ)2 ≤
δ2
(1− γλ)2 , (106)
where the last inequality follows from the bounded reward variation in Assumption 2.
With these inequalities, we bound the difference between the local and global increments by
1
N
∑
n∈N
‖gkn(θn)− g¯k(θ′)‖2 =
1
N
∑
n∈N
‖Ak(θn − θ′) + bkn − b¯k‖2
≤ 1
N
∑
n∈N
2‖Ak‖2‖θn − θ′‖2 + 1
N
∑
n∈N
2‖bkn − b¯k‖2
≤2
(
1 + γ
1− γλ
)2
1
N
∑
n∈N
‖θn − θ′‖2 + 2δ
2
(1− γλ)2 , (107)
which completes the proof.
D.3 Proof of Lemma 3
For simplicity, we define an auxiliary variable xk1 as
xk1 :=
k−1∑
κ=0
µ
2b k−κ−1τGHG c(ηκ)2. (108)
Note that b kτGHG c increases when k mod τGHG = 0. We define an auxiliary function h(k) with
h(k) := k mod τGHG , (109)
so that k − h(k) is divisible by τGHG . We can bound xk1 by
xk1 =
k−h(k)−1∑
κ=0
µ
2b k−κ−1τGHG c(ηκ)2 +
k−1∑
κ=k−h(k)
µ
2b k−κ−1τGHG c(ηκ)2
=
k−h(k)−1∑
κ=0
µ
2b k−κ−1τGHG c(ηκ)2 +
k−1∑
κ=k−h(k)
(ηκ)2
≤
k−h(k)−1∑
κ=0
µ
2b k−h(k)−κ−1τGHG c(ηκ−h(k))2 + h(k)(ηk−h(k))2
≤
k−h(k)
τGHG −1∑
s=0
µ
2(
k−h(k)
τGHG −s−1)τGHG(ηsτGHG )2 + h(k)(ηk−h(k))2. (110)
Additionally, we define another auxiliary variable x˜S1 as
x˜S1 :=
S−1∑
s=0
µ2(S−s−1)τGHG(ηsτGHG )2 for S = 1, 2, · · · . (111)
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It is clear that
x˜S+11 = µ
2x˜S1 + τGHG(η
SτGHG )2 for S = 1, 2, · · · , (112)
It can be shown by induction that, when ηk is chosen small (or k0 is large) enough such that(
η(S−1)τGHG
ηSτGHG
)2
≤ 3− µ
2
2
≤ 2− µ2 for S = 1, 2, · · · , (113)
it follows
x˜S1 ≤
2− µ2
(1− µ2)2 τGHG(η
SτGHG )2 for S = 0, 1, 2, · · · . (114)
With (114), (110) can be bounded by
xk1 ≤
k−h(k)
τGHG −1∑
s=0
µ
2(
k−h(k)
τGHG −s−1)τGHG(ηsτGHG )2 + h(k)(ηk−h(k))2
≤x˜
k−h(k)
τGHG
1 + h(k)(η
k−h(k))2
≤ 2− µ
2
(1− µ2)2 τGHG(η
k−h(k))2 + h(k)(ηk−h(k))2
≤
(
1 +
2− µ2
(1− µ2)2
)
τGHG(ηk−h(k))2. (115)
Observe that x01 still satisfies the inequality above, which complete the proof.
D.4 Proof of Lemma 4
We define an auxiliary variable xk2 for k = 1, 2, · · · with
xk2 :=
4N3Dδ2
(1− γλ)2
(
1 +
2− µ2
(1− µ2)2
)
τGHG(ηk−h(k))2
+ 4N2(
1 + γ
1− γλ )
2
k−1∑
κ=0
µ
2b k−κτGHG c(ηκ)2‖Θκ − Θˆκ‖2F , (116)
and for k = 0 with
x02 := 2N
2‖Θ0 − Θˆ0‖2F +
4N3Dδ2
(1− γλ)2
(
1 +
2− µ2
(1− µ2)2
)
τGHG(η0)2. (117)
Similar to the technique used in proving Lemma 3, we bound xk2 with x
k−h(k)
2 by
xk2 ≤
4N3Dδ2
(1− γλ)2
(
1 +
2− µ2
(1− µ2)2
)
τGHG(ηk−h(k))2
+ 4N2(
1 + γ
1− γλ )
2
k−h(k)−1∑
κ=0
µ
2b k−κτGHG c(ηκ)2‖Θκ − Θˆκ‖2F
+ 4N2(
1 + γ
1− γλ )
2
k−1∑
κ=k−h(k)
(ηκ)2‖Θκ − Θˆκ‖2F . (118)
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With the relation ‖Θκ − Θˆκ‖2F ≤ xκ2 , we have
xk2 ≤xk−h(k)2 + 4N2(
1 + γ
1− γλ )
2
k−1∑
κ=k−h(k)
(ηκ)2xκ2
≤
(
1 + 4N2(
1 + γ
1− γλ )
2(ηk−1)2
)
x
k−h(k)
2 + 8N
2(
1 + γ
1− γλ )
2
k−2∑
κ=k−h(k)
(ηκ)2xκ2
≤
(
1 + (1 + 2 + · · ·+ 2h(k)−1)
)
x
k−h(k)
2 + 2
h(k)+1N2(
1 + γ
1− γλ )
2(ηk−h(k))2xk−h(k)2
≤2h(k)+1xk−h(k)2 + 2h(k)+2N2(
1 + γ
1− γλ )
2(ηk−h(k))2xk−h(k)2
≤2h(k)+2xk−h(k)2 , (119)
where the second and fourth inequalities come from the condition of step size
4N2(
1 + γ
1− γλ )
2(ηSτGHG )2 ≤ 1− µ
2
2τGHG+4
≤ 1. (120)
Revisiting that k − h(k) is divisible by τGHG , we further bound (118) by
x
k−h(k)
2 ≤
4N3Dδ2
(1− γλ)2
(
1 +
2− µ2
(1− µ2)2
)
τGHG(ηk−h(k))2
+ 4N2(
1 + γ
1− γλ )
2
k−h(k)−1∑
κ=0
µ
2b k−h(k)−κτGHG c(ηκ)2‖Θκ − Θˆκ‖2F . (121)
With (119), the last term of (121) follows
k−h(k)−1∑
κ=0
µ
2b k−h(k)−κτGHG c(ηκ)2‖Θκ − Θˆκ‖2F ≤ 2τGHG+3
k−h(k)
τGHG −1∑
s=0
µ
2(
k−h(k)
τGHG −s−1)(ηsτGHG )2xsτGHG2 . (122)
Substituting (122) into (121) makes it possible to write xk2 in a recursive form, with which we can
derive the bound for xsτGHG2 . Similar to what we have done for x
k
1 in the proof of Lemma 3, we define
another auxiliary variable x˜S2 as
x˜S2 :=
4N3Dδ2
(1− γλ)2
(
1 +
2− µ2
(1− µ2)2
)
τGHG(ηSτGHG )2
+ 2τGHG+5N2(
1 + γ
1− γλ )
2
S−1∑
s=0
µ2(S−s−1)(ηsτGHG )2x˜s2. (123)
Then, we have the following relation between x˜S+12 and x˜
S
2 , given by
x˜S+12 =µ
2x˜S2 + 2
τGHG+5N2(
1 + γ
1− γλ )
2(ηSτGHG )2x˜S2
+
4N3Dδ2
(1− γλ)2
(
1 +
2− µ2
(1− µ2)2
)
τGHG
(
(η(S+1)τGHG )2 − µ2(ηSτGHG )2
)
≤
(
µ2 + 2τGHG+5N2(
1 + γ
1− γλ )
2(ηSτGHG )2
)
x˜S2
+
4N3Dδ2
(1− γλ)2
(
1 +
2− µ2
(1− µ2)2
)
(1− µ2)τGHG(ηSτGHG )2
≤
(
1 + µ2
2
)
xk2 +
4N3Dδ2
(1− γλ)2
(
1 +
2− µ2
(1− µ2)2
)
(1− µ2)τGHG(ηSτGHG )2, (124)
31
Wu, Shen, Chen and Ling
where the first inequality comes from η(S+1)τGHG ≤ ηSτGHG and the second one uses
2τGHG+5N2(
1 + γ
1− γλ )
2(ηSτGHG )2 ≤ 1− µ
2
2
. (125)
Using induction again, under the condition that ηk satisfies(
η(S−1)τGHG
ηSτGHG
)2
≤ 3− µ
2
2
for S = 1, 2, · · · , (126)
we have the following bound for S = 1, 2, · · · that
x˜S2 ≤
8N2Dδ2
(1− γλ)2
(
1 +
2− µ2
(1− µ2)2
)
3− µ2
1− µ2 τGHG(η
SτGHG )2 + 2N2‖Θ0 − Θˆ0‖2F
(
1 + µ2
2
)2S
=
8N2Dδ2
(1− γλ)2
(
1 +
2− µ2
(1− µ2)2
)
3− µ2
1− µ2 τGHG(η
SτGHG )2, (127)
where the equality comes from Θ0 = Θˆ0. We can verify (127) remains true for x˜02. Plugging (127)
into (119) yields
xk2 ≤ 2τGHG+5
N2Dδ2
(1− γλ)2
(
1 +
2− µ2
(1− µ2)2
)
3− µ2
1− µ2 τGHG(η
k−h(k))2, (128)
which completes the proof.
D.5 Proof of Lemma 5
We use km to represent the smallest k satisfying k > τ(η
k). When k > km, taking expectation on
both sides and substituting (34) in Theorem 3 into (72), it follows
E‖ωk+1 − θ∞λ ‖2 ≤
1− σminηk
1− βk E‖ω
k − θ∞λ ‖2 +
1
1− βk 2C6(η
k)2C ln(
k + k0
η
) +
(ηk)2
βk
2DGδ2
(1− γλ)2 .
(129)
With βk = σminη
k/2, as long as σminη
0/2 ≤ 1/2, it follows that
1− σminηk
1− βk ≤ 1−
σminη
k
2
and
1
1− βk ≤ 2. (130)
Therefore, (129) becomes
E‖ωk+1 − θ∞λ ‖2 ≤ (1−
σminη
k
2
)E‖ωk − θ∞λ ‖2 + 4C6(ηk)2C ln(
k + k0
η
) +
2ηk
σmin
2DGδ2
(1− γλ)2
≤
k∏
j=km
(1− σminη
j
2
)E‖ωkm − θ∞λ ‖2 +
k∑
i=km
4C6(η
i)2C ln(
i+ k0
η
)
k∏
j=i+1
(1− σminη
j
2
)
+
k∑
i=km
2ηi
σmin
2DGδ2
(1− γλ)2
k∏
j=i+1
(1− σminη
j
2
)
≤
k∏
j=km
(1− σminη
j
2
)E‖ωkm − θ∞λ ‖2 +
k∑
i=0
4C6(η
i)2C ln(
i+ k0
η
)
k∏
j=i+1
(1− σminη
j
2
)
+
k∑
i=0
2ηi
σmin
2DGδ2
(1− γλ)2
k∏
j=i+1
(1− σminη
j
2
). (131)
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To obtain a more compact form, consider the relation
1− σminη
k
2
= 1− σminη
2(k + k0)
≤ (1− 1
k + k0
)σminη/2 = (
k − 1 + k0
k + k0
). (132)
Thus, it follows
k∏
j=i+1
(1− σminη
j
2
) ≤ ( i+ k
0
k + k0
). (133)
This leads to the following bound on the second term at the RHS of (131), given by
k∑
i=0
4C6(η
i)2C ln(
i+ k0
η
)
k∏
j=i+1
(1− σminη
j
2
) ≤
k∑
i=0
4C6(η
i)2C ln(
i+ k0
η
)(
i+ k0
k + k0
)
=4C6C(
η
k + k0
)
k∑
i=0
ln( i+k
0
η )
( i+k
0
η )
2− ≤ 4C6Cϕ(k), (134)
where the last inequality comes from the following lemma.
Lemma 6 When k0 is chosen large enough that k0 > ηe2−, then
(
η
k + k0
)
k∑
i=0
ln( i+k
0
η )
( i+k
0
η )
2− ≤ ϕ(k), (135)
where the function ϕ(k) is defined in (22).
Similarly, the third term at the RHS of (131) satisfies
k∑
i=0
2ηi
σmin
2DGδ2
(1− γλ)2
k∏
j=i+1
(1− σminη
j
2
) ≤
k∑
i=0
2η
(i+ k0)σmin
2DGδ2
(1− γλ)2 (
i+ k0
k + k0
)
≤ 2η
σmin
2DGδ2
(1− γλ)2
k∑
i=0
(
i+ k0
k + k0
)−1
1
k + k0
=
2
σ2min
2DGδ2
(1− γλ)2 
k∑
i=0
(
i+ k0
k + k0
)−1
1
k + k0
≤ 8
σmin
DGδ2
(1− γλ)2 ,
(136)
where the last inequality is the result of the following lemma.
Lemma 7 For any positive integer k and large enough k0, it holds

k∑
i=0
(
i+ k0
k + k0
)−1 ≤ 2. (137)
Substituting (136) into (131) yields
E‖ωk+1 − θ∞λ ‖2 ≤E‖ωkm − θ∞λ ‖2
(
km + k
0
k + k0
)
+ 4C6Cϕ(k) +
8
σ2min
DGδ2
(1− γλ)2 . (138)
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Choosing βk = 12 in (72) and using Theorem 3, we have
‖ωkm − θ∞λ ‖2 ≤2‖ωkm−1 + ηkg¯k(ωk)− θ∞λ ‖2 + 2(ηk)2
2DGδ2
(1− γλ)2
≤2‖ωkm−1 + ηkg¯k(ωk)− θ∞λ ‖2 + 2(ηk)2
2DGδ2
(1− γλ)2
≤4
(
1 + ηk
(
1 + γ
1− γλ
))2
‖ωkm−1 − θ∞λ ‖2 + 2(ηk)2C7
≤
(
2 + 2η0
(
1 + γ
1− γλ
))2km
‖ω0 − θ∞λ ‖2 + 2(η0)2C7C8, (139)
where constants C7 and C8 are given by
C7 :=2
((
1 + γ
1− γλ
)
‖θ∞λ ‖+
(
Rmax
1− γλ
))2
+
2DGδ2
(1− γλ)2 ,
C8 :=
(
2 + 2η0
(
1+γ
1−γλ
))2km − 1(
2 + 2η0
(
1+γ
1−γλ
))
− 1
. (140)
Plugging (139) into (138), we have
E‖ωk − θ∞λ ‖2 ≤
C2
2
(
1
k + k0
)
+ 4C6Cϕ(k) +
8
σ2min
DGδ2
(1− γλ)2 , (141)
where we use a the fact that ω0 = θ0 to simplify the inequality and the constant is defined as
C2 := 2‖θ0 − θ∞λ ‖2
((
2 + 2η0
(
1 + γ
1− γλ
))2km
‖θ0 − θ∞λ ‖2 + 2(η0)2C7C8
)
(km + k
0). (142)
D.6 Proof of Lemma 6
We proceed by discussing the bound under different values of .
First, when  ≥ 2, ln(x)x2− is a monotonically increasing function, then
k∑
i=0
ln( i+k
0
η )
( i+k
0
η )
2− ≤
∫ k+1+k0
η
k0
η
ln(x)
x2−
dx
≤ 1
(− 1)2
(
(− 1) ln
(
k + 1 + k0
η
)
+ 1
)(
k + 1 + k0
η
)−1
.
Second, when 1 <  < 2 and k
0
η ≥ e2−, ln(x)x2− is monotonically decreasing on (k
0−1
η ,
k+k0
η ), then
k∑
i=0
ln( i+k
0
η )
( i+k
0
η )
2− ≤
∫ k+k0
η
k0−1
η
ln(x)
x2−
dx ≤ 1
(− 1)2
(
(− 1) ln
(
k + k0
η
)
+ 1
)(
k + k0
η
)−1
.
Third, when  = 1 and k
0
η ≥ e2−, ln(x)x2− is monotonically decreasing on (k
0−1
η ,
k+k0
η ), then
k∑
i=0
ln( i+k
0
η )
( i+k
0
η )
2− ≤
∫ k+k0
η
k0−1
η
ln(x)
x
dx ≤ ln
(
k + k0
η
)2
.
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Fourth, when 0 <  < 1 and k
0
η ≥ e2−, ln(x)x2− is monotonically decreasing on (k
0−1
η ,
k+k0
η ), then
k∑
i=0
ln( i+k
0
η )
( i+k
0
η )
2− ≤
∫ k+k0
η
k0−1
η
ln(x)
x2−
dx
≤ 1
(− 1)2
(
(1− ) ln
(
k0 − 1
η
)
− 1
)(
k0 − 1
η
)−1
.
For simplicity, we merge the first two cases and complete the proof.
D.7 Proof of Lemma 7
When  > 1, x−1 is monotonically increasing on (0,+∞) and
k∑
i=0
(
i+ k0
k + k0
)−1
1
k + k0
=
k−1∑
i=0
(
i+ k0
k + k0
)−1
1
k + k0
+
1
k + k0
≤
∫ 1
0
x−1dx+
1
k + k0
≤ 1

+
1
k + k0
. (143)
When  = 1, it holds
k∑
i=0
(
i+ k0
k + k0
)−1
1
k + k0
=
k + 1
k + k0
≤ 1. (144)
When 0 <  < 1, x−1 is monotonically decreasing on (0,+∞) and
k∑
i=0
(
i+ k0
k + k0
)−1
1
k + k0
≤
∫ 1
0
x−1dx ≤ 1

. (145)
In each of the cases above, 
∑k
i=0(
i+k0
k+k0 )
−1 ≤ 2, which completes the proof.
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